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Introduction
President’s Trumps international agenda is often viewed as a part of a wider po-
litical shift, which undermines the current liberal global order and places more 
emphasis on the nation state as an international player.1 Events such as Brexit, 
Matteo Renzi’s lost referendum, the general strengthening of far-right and popu-
list parties are often cited in this context. The phenomenon itself seems to be quite 
considerable in scope. The politicians described as populists or nationalists are 
still not a dominant force in most of the elections in developed countries. Howev-
er, a new divide that moves beyond the post-war left-right division can be clearly 
observed and variously described. This study will propose the notions of two 
ideological camps: globalism and localism (with a special focus on national-lo-
calism). It will also examine the fi rst year of president Trump’s presidency using 
the historical analysis tools proposed by Harold James and Stephen Skowronek.
1 T. Wright, “Trump’s Team of Rivals, Riven by Distrust”, Foreign Policy, 14.12.2016, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/14/trumps-team-of-rivals-riven-by-distrust [accessed: 














As every new ideological divide, the new shift has a huge potential for 
disruption and confl ict. This article will further argue that from the point of view 
of the history of political thought a strong political backlash against the liber-
al globalization is to be expected. In this context, for all the criticism of presi-
dent Trump’s foreign policies, his presidency off ers a potential for stabilization 
through anti-globalist rebalancing both in the context of international and domes-
tic policies. This rebalancing in turn, has the potential for dismantling an even 
more radical anti-globalist and nationalist backlash.
The Globalism-Localism Divide
The phenomenon of party dealignment2 was the fi rst sign of the crisis of the no-
tions of left and right. Nevertheless, during the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst 
century those notions were still not openly challenged as an accurate description 
of politico-ideological division. Ian Bunge, after considerable research on parties 
and party programs, in 2000 still defi ned the main dichotomy in the following 
way:
















– freedom and rights
Source: I. Bunge, “Identifying Dimensions and Locating Parties: Methodological and Conceptual 
Problems”, [in:] Handbook of Party Politics, eds. R. Katz, W. Crotty, London 2006, p. 429.
Bunge clearly assumed that the period of party dealignment is not a mo-
ment at which new ideologies are created. In line with Fukuyamian intuitions3, he 
seemed to describe a universal crisis of ideologies as such rather than a transitory 
period from one ideological divide to the other. According to this theory, the glo-
balized liberal democracy and free trade were to abolish all ideological divisions. 
And democracy was supposed to turn tacitly into a consensual post-democracy.4 
The sentiments, however, have changed in the second decade of the twenty-fi rst 
2 M. Wattenberg, “The Decline of Party Mobilization”, [in:] Parties without Partisans: 
Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, eds. R. Dalton, M. Wattenberg, Oxford 
2000, pp. 64–76.
3 F. Fukuyama, End of History and The Last Man, New York 1992, pp. 27–31.
4 C. Crouch, Post-Democracy, Cambridge 2004, p. 68.
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century. New ideologies have begun to appear in the political aftermath of the 
fi nancial crisis. New social phenomena became apparent: the rise of the precar-
iat5 (the new underclass) and the global mass migration (a new security chal-
lenge). Those ideologies, nonetheless, were still unnamed when political scien-
tists started examining the wave of elections and referendums that swept through 
the Western states (defi ned as the USA and EU members) between 2015–2016. 
It was clear that politicians challenging the Fukuyamian dream, such as Donald 
Trump, Boris Johnson, Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen were something new. Some 
saw in this phenomenon just a new wave of right-wing populist reaction.6 At the 
same time, the social-democratic left has lost almost all of it socialist zeal, and 
became a family of complacent parties of the aspiring urban middle-class. In line 
with Anthony Giddens’ postulate, the left focused on the quality of life7 rather 
than on redistribution or indeed any form of social justice. In many countries, 
this made the left surprisingly liberal (in the classical sense) and very close to 
business. As a result the new populist have taken over some of the left-wing so-
cialism and some of the right-wing identity politics. They are, however, clearly 
not the old-style right any more, but neither are their opponents the old-style left. 
The new ideological divide is still not well-researched today, however, the fi rst 
conceptualizations have already been presented in some rather general terms. 
The opposing camps receive various names: an early notion was proposed by 
Stephan Shakespeare, the British head of YouGov, who described the two options 
as “drawbridge up” and “drawbridge down”.8 In his recent book, The Road to 
Somewhere9 David Goodhart sees “two rival value blocks”. “Anywheres” value 
freedom, openness, and shifting identities. True to their name, thanks to educa-
tion and being employed in trades that deal with cutting-edge technology, they 
can live and work almost anywhere. By contrast, the “somewheres” are more 
imbedded in the local; they see family, security and group identity as values of 
paramount importance. Again, as the name suggests they are “are rooted and usu-
ally have ‘ascribed’ identities”.10
Trying to describe a similar divide in the Polish politics, I propose a dif-
ferent division:
5 G. Standing, Precariat. The New Dangerous Class, London 2011.
6 J.B. Judis, The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and 
European Politics, New York 2016.
7 A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, Cam-
bridge 1991, p. 214.
8 “Drawbridges up”, The Economist, 30.07.2016, https://www.economist.com/news/brief-
ing/21702748-new-divide-rich-countries-not-between-left-and-right-between-open-and [accessed: 
5.11.2017].
9 D. Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere: The New Tribes Shaping British Politics, London 
2017, pp. 19–44.
10 Ibidem, p. 3. 
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– compensation equal to competencies;
– tolerance;
– multiculturalism
– small and medium-sized businesses;






– local traditions, national identity, state sovereignty
Source: M. Kuź, “Globalism and Localism in the Perspective of Polish Politics”, The Warsaw Insti-
tute Review 2017, qr. 2, No. 2, pp. 20–27.
The term “localists” seems to be more pertinent than the “nationalist” or 
“populists”, and less vague and uncommunicative that “somewheres” or “draw-
bridges up”. This is because it encompasses a wide range of anti-globalist ap-
proaches that are not necessary a simple return to the nation state as understood 
in the nineteenth century. The new localism is not tantamount to an all-embracing 
statism. As a matter of fact, it often seeks to maintain a free or partly-free market 
economy and personal liberty, although, within the confi nes of the nation-state. 
Especially in economy, it views the state as something more than Smith’s night-
watchmen but not necessarily the all-powerful controller. The state seems to be 
more as a shepherd, who shields national businesses from damaging infl uences 
with the use of various regulatory means.11 One also needs to note a crucial diff er-
ence between the European localists like Jaroslaw Kaczyński, Sebastian Kurz or 
Marine Le Pen and Trump. The old-world localists have no qualms about increas-
ing the welfare programs and expanding the role of the state as a redistributor, 
while, Trump is still very much a “small state” republican. His tool of choice for 
social politics is protectionism and other bring-the-jobs-back policies, such as 
the recent tax reform encouraging the repatriation of foreign capital owned by 
American companies.12
Localists worldwide are also starkly diff erent from the anti-Western au-
thoritarians, who tend to side with Russia or China. What we witness seems to be 
more of anti-globalist rebalancing within the West. Nevertheless, one of the typi-
cal element of this rebalancing is accusing new ideological movements of siding 
with non-Western forces. As a matter of fact, the current accusations of being pro-
Russian, leveled against localists such as Trump or Kaczynski, are reminiscent 
11 Cf. J. Kurlantzick, State Capitalism, Oxford 2016, pp. 37–49.
12 J. Ciolli, “Trump’s Tax Plan Could Bring $250 Billion Into the US – Here Are the Com-
panies Set to Benefi t Most”, Business Insider, 20.12.2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-
tax-reform-plan-repatriation-14-us-companies-with-most-cash-overseas-2017-9?IR=T [accessed: 
18.11.2017].
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of the similar accusation leveled at Western social-democrats for their purported 
(or in some cases quite real) ties with the Soviets. For all the Soviet infl uences 
in Western social-democratic parties, their activities ultimately cannot be inter-
preted merely as a conspiracy against the West. Historically, those parties had 
led to a change in the Western mainstream and the construction of the modern 
welfare state, which in no way amounts to sabotaging the enemies of the Soviet 
Union. Currently, the trend is diff erent but the logic remains the same. A number 
of parties and politicians believe that the institution of the nation-state needs to 
be protected from the neoliberal globalization and off er a new rebalancing that 
the old political forces, however, very often interpret as hostility and treason. 
Nevertheless, what Donald Trump seems to be doing, is trying to propose anti-
globalization within the West as new ideological dynamic and an alternative de-
velopment option. This desire can be clearly identifi ed in the UN speech Trump 
made in September 2017:
In foreign aff airs, we are renewing this founding principle of sovereignty. Our govern-
ment’s fi rst duty is to its people, to our citizens – to serve their needs, to ensure their safety, 
to preserve their rights, and to defend their values.
As President of the United States, I will always put America fi rst, just like you, as 
the leaders of your countries will always, and should always, put your countries fi rst. […]
All responsible leaders have an obligation to serve their own citizens, and the nation-
state remains the best vehicle for elevating the human condition.
But making a better life for our people also requires us to work together in close har-
mony and unity to create a more safe and peaceful future for all people.13
Global Uniformity or the Art of the Deal
The large trade agreement such as TTIP and TPP are notoriously complicated 
multi-state deals. The limitations they impose on the state-legislation is consider-
able14 to say the least. The protection of rights of large companies that presumes 
their personhood itself is a very problematic concept.15 All those factors create an 
impression that modern trade agreements are moving in the direction of impos-
ing a uniform global trading regime which would circumvent the prerogatives of 
states and individuals whom those states are said to represent. Moreover, political 
actors, especially those of aspiring political parties, can easily lay the blame for 
all economic shortcoming of their countries at the doorstep of the authors of the 
deal, i.e. a previous government, and win elections with an anti-globalist agenda.
13 “Full Text: Trump’s 2017 U.N. Speech Transcript”, Politico, 19.09.2017, https://www.
politico.com/story/2017/09/19/trump-un-speech-2017-full-text-transcript-242879 [accessed: 
18.11.2017].
14 H. Sweetland Edwards, Shadow Courts: The Tribunals that Rule Global Trade, New 
York 2017, pp. 17–20. 
15 L. Strate, “The Supreme Identifi cation of Corporations as Persons”, ETC: A Review of 
General Semantics 2010, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 280–286. 
64 MICHAŁ KUŹ
The phenomenon itself is by no means new. Already in the early 2000’s 
a renowned historian of economic thought, James, predicted that the lack of po-
litical control of the global trade can lead to frustrations, similar to those that were 
witnessed by the already fairly globalized world in the fi rst half of the twentieth 
century.16 From that perspective both world wars can be seen as attempts to regu-
late the mechanism by a brutal power-grab on the part of the states that became 
ruled by anti-globalist forces. After the Second World War, in the West the ten-
sion between the states and the markets was resolved by the creation of welfare 
state. This prevented social dissatisfaction from reaching critical levels and was 
coupled with setting up global organizations like WTO to ensure a stable trading 
environment. For all that, with more global trade some of the old problems have 
started resurfacing. Specifi cally, those involving the growing global discrepan-
cies in income17 such as the rise of the new disadvantaged class that lives without 
the social safety net, stability and savings that the previous generation enjoyed.
Not dealing with those issues can lead to another unprecedented overdrive 
of the whole global system, which again is not a new concept. As a matter of fact, 
it has been explored already by Karl Polanyi18 and Joseph Schumpeter19, both of 
whom saw fascism and communism as violent responses to the antimonies cre-
ated by liberal politics. Alternatively, the world may face a period of a long “secu-
lar stagnation”20 that could over time lead to a period of social instability and 
economic ineffi  ciency of unpreceded length, indeed something to be compared 
to the new “dark ages”. Given the problems with the current global institutions 
and their growing unpopularity that is refl ected in the localist’s political rhetoric, 
there are few silver-bullet solutions. The key decision-makers can either create 
a more coherent global regime that would enable global regulation and redistri-
bution, or grant more power to the exiting state institutions; and thus, try to cool 
down globalization in a controlled way.
The fi rst solution has a clear progressive appeal. However, it faces two 
problems. Firstly, global and regional regulatory institutions lack legitimacy. In 
the modern politics it is tacitly assumed that legitimacy is granted through proce-
dures that are recognized as democratic i.e. drawing power directly from a large 
population rather than from a supernatural being (the mandate of heavens). Still, 
democratic decision making is practicable only if the voters have a minimal com-
mon understanding of key life-style and political concepts and argue only over the 
more detailed interpretations. This seems to be corroborated by Ronald Inglehart 
16 H. James, The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression, Cambridge, 
MA 2001, pp. 101–168.
17 T. Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge, MA 2014, pp. 57–70. 
18 K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Boston 2001, pp. 171–231.
19 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York 2008, pp. 187–217.
20 “Defi nition of secular stagnation”, Financial Times, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?ter-
m=secular-stagnation [accessed: 18.11.2017]. 
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and Christian Welzel21, whose large scale research on global values point to the 
fact that members of the exiting nation-states tend to share many values and can 
be subdivided into larger cultural categories. Secondly, even leaving aside the 
issue of representativeness and legitimacy of global governance, there are no 
global institutions that would be able to carry out the task of global coordination 
and redistribution for a prolonged period of time. Even the new technologies 
seem to be of little help, the involvement of new media in the political processes 
have so far only led to violent outburst of short-term activism, sometimes aptly 
called “slacktivism”.22
Even the global corporations, in spite of their wealth, to a large extent still 
rely on the stability provided by the exiting nation states. The existing interna-
tional organizations also fall back on the nation-states as their building blocks. 
Non-governmental institutions have so far been able to act as providers of social 
safety and stability only in emergency situations. Regional cooperation blocks 
vary in their cohesion, with EU being the most tightly-knit union. At this point, 
such cooperation seems to be the only option for smaller states which seek to 
improve their bargaining power. At the same time the social problems created 
by global economy are quite urgent. In short, it is highly unlikely that a radically 
new global government that takes over some of the prerogative of the nation 
states will come into existence.
Given the above circumstances, the only solution seems to be to empower 
the exiting state structures in a controlled way (rather than risk a violent power 
grab of radical forces). And this is precisely what president Trumps attempts to 
do. The further rationale behind his actions is a world order that is more state-
based and can become a more fl exible, auto-regulating system. Let us not forget 
that the period between 1814–1914 was one of the longest periods of peace in 
Western history. The liberal-globalist faction can, at the same time, content itself 
with the notion that international institutions can be simultaneously developed 
over time. However, given the insuffi  ciency of the existing institutions, the logi-
cal short term solution is to fall back on the older nation-state based system.
In short, what president Trump seems to propose is a fl exible environment 
of transactional politics instead of large multilateral deals that tie the hands of 
all the partners involved. This transactional approach has already yielded certain 
results. The current economic data falsify the claim that the abandoning TTP 
and TTIP will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy, which is develop-
ing very fast and indeed creates new jobs. Recently this has been admitted by 
George Soros a major investment guru, notorious for betting against Trump and 
21 R. Inglehart, Ch. Welzel, “The WVS Cultural Map of the World”, World Value Sur-
vey, 2014, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings [accessed: 
19.11.2017].
22 D. McCaff erty, “Activism vs Slactivism”, Communications of the ACM 2011, Vol. 54, 
No. 12, pp. 17–19.
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his economic policies.23 NATO fi nancing is another example. Of course, the plans 
to increase the funding were in motion already before Trump assumed offi  ce. 
However, president Trump clearly did add “[…] urgency to a decision that had 
already been taken”.24
Global Safety in the Trump Era
The global safety also becomes increasingly dominated by state politics rather 
than a “global community” approach. For better and for worse it is also the state 
politics, rather the pressure of international organizations, that currently leads to 
a so-far successful campaign against the ISIS. Naturally, it may be said that states 
are both the major causes and the solutions to the global safety issues. However, 
it remains a fact that the UN peacekeeping missions achieved little success and 
at times ended in spectacular failures.25 UN remains more of a platform for in-
terstate communication than a robust institutions with its own political agenda. 
Indeed, it is used in such a way by the Trump administration, especially in the 
wake of the Korean Missile crisis that is unfolding as this article is being prepared 
for publication.
The EU, in spite of many attempts to create a military muscle, never suc-
ceeded in building it and still largely relies on the U.S. for safety. Given the 
increasing tensions in the Pacifi c region and clear symptoms of imperial over-
stretch, the strategy seems questionable. The EU states are, moreover, increas-
ingly at odds with Turkey. The state is repressive towards its own citizens, detains 
EU citizens and blackmails the Western Europe with threats of facilitating mass 
migration. Turkey also more and more openly challenges the U.S. leadership, 
and continues to have unsettled territorial disputes with Greece. This is quite 
signifi cant, given that Turkey army is the second largest military force in NATO 
and the largest land-force of the alliance.26 At the same time, U.S. is seeking to 
make the notorious a pivot to Asia, which seems necessary given China’s military 
buildup in the South-China Sea and the Korean tensions. As RAND Corpora-
tion notes, this situation is something that the Russian Federation can easily take 
23 H. Zschäpitz, „George Soros kapituliert vor der Wall Street“, Die Welt, 16.11.2017, 
https://www.welt.de/fi nanzen/article170659763/George-Soros-kapituliert-vor-der-Wall-Street.
html [accessed: 19.11.2017].
24 Ch. Morris, “Reality Check: Is Donald Trump right on Nato’s Funding Boost?”, BBC, 
6.07.2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40525116 [accessed: 19.11.2017].
25 W. Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords, and a World of Endless 
Confl ict, New York 2000; L.M. Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cambridge 2008.
26 “2017 Turkey Military Strength”, Global Firepower, https://www.globalfi repower.com/
country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=turkey [accessed: 20.11.2017].
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advantage of.27 If the USA forces are suddenly occupied in the Pacifi c region an 
opportunistic attack on the Baltic States, Ukraine or even Poland is possible.
Unfortunately, the existing international institutions such as the EU and 
UN are clearly not able to take fuller responsibility for global safety. NATO is 
over-reliant on the U.S. contributions, while the second largest army in the pact 
belongs to a country clearly at odds with the rest of the alliance. In this situation, 
increasing the military spending as proposed by president Trump seems to be 
a logical solution. Another great powers concert seems to be the lesser danger at 
a time when just one power appears to be the main global security provider.
Mass Migration and the Antinomies of Multiculturalism
The weakening of the state without adequate robustness of the existing interna-
tional institutions can be, at least, partly blamed for the current migrations crisis. 
The refugees come mainly from failed states that are torn by war; the economic 
migrants from the states that are not able to leave the poverty trap.
This, at least, in part is a result of the fact that the recent restructuring of 
the nation-state was, in fact, a global weakening of the role of the state to meet 
the demands of economic and cultural globalization. In what Immanuel Waller-
stein named “the center”28, this weakening led to certain political tensions. The 
situation was, however, much worse in the peripheries, there it lead to a stalling 
of state development, precisely at the time when such a development was neces-
sary to prevent the citizens from migrating; but at a point when they had enough 
resources to cover the costs of the trip. Thus, the mechanism of the current crisis 
of globalization is a systemic crisis embedded in the very logic of globalization 
and its antimonies.
A typical globalist response to mass migration is, however, not to facili-
tate state building but to increase the move towards greater openness and deal 
with humanitarian crises with the help of emergency aid. The proponents of glo-
balism will also see strong national identities that preclude a more multicultural 
environment as major problems, especially in the states that receive mass migra-
tion. Globalist-leaning commentators will also swiftly stigmatize anti-migrant 
politicians and parties as racists and anti-democratic.29 Leaving aside the veracity 
of such accusations, there are deeper problems with the globalist response. It 
27 D.C. Gompert, A. Stuth Cevallos, C.L. Garafola, War with China. Thinking Through the 
Unthinkable, Santa Monica 2016, pp. 56–60, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.
html [accessed: 20.11.2017].
28 A. Wallerstein, World System Analysis: An Introduction, Durham 2007, pp. 76–91.
29 This Foreign Policy article can serve as a representative example of many similar 
pieces publish in this and other globalist magazines dealing with foreign aff airs: M. Boot, “The 
GOP Is America’s Party of White Nationalism”, Foreign Policy, 14.03.2017, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2017/03/14/the-gop-is-americas-party-of-white-nationalism/ [accessed: 22.11.2017].
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overlooks the real socio-economic problem that results from the weakening of the 
state. The current migration is a product of a progressive collapse of periphery 
with few state structures into the center that is still equipped with relatively well-
functioning (albeit weakened) states that provide social security and the rule of 
law. From a localist perspective, this implosion cannot be good for either side. 
This standpoint is adopted by president Trump when in the aforementioned UN 
speech he said:
For decades, the United States has dealt with migration challenges here in the Western 
Hemisphere. We have learned that, over the long term, uncontrolled migration is deeply 
unfair to both the sending and the receiving countries.
For the sending countries, it reduces domestic pressure to pursue needed political and 
economic reform, and drains them of the human capital necessary to motivate and imple-
ment those reforms.
For the receiving countries, the substantial costs of uncontrolled migration are borne 
overwhelmingly by low-income citizens whose concerns are often ignored by both media 
and government.30 
Of course, this approach is not completely in tune with severe cuts in 
foreign aid that the Trump administration has put into eff ect. Nevertheless, it is 
consistent with a more fl exible approach to free-trade. It is also consistent with 
president Trump’s repeated criticism of the open-border policy adopted in 2015 
by Angela Merkel and his attempts at limiting the infl ux of migrants to the USA. 
Of course, his initial attempts at enacting those policies met with hostility in the 
Congress and indeed were rather unsuccessful. Still, at this point, even the Demo-
crats actually support tighter border controls (without a physical wall), and seem 
to be willing to compromise with the president in exchange for Trumps decision 
not repeal the former law which grants a path to citizenship to the migrants that 
are already present in the USA and came there as children.31
Bringing the State Back in, or Why Is the Rebalancing Necessary
According to the afore mentioned James, the current world order is, at least, as 
susceptible to the shocks coming from within as the previous one, which was 
based on the gold standard and the power of colonial empires. At the time when 
James’s work was created, no one had any inkling of the current rise of anti-glo-
balization forces. James, however, was quite confi dent that they will be similar 
to the anti-globalization forces from the past. One can mane eight defi ning points 
of the old anti-globalism, as defi ned by James. They, in turn, can be compared 
30 “Full text: Trump’s 2017 U.N. Speech Transcript”, op. cit.
31 J.T. Bennet, “Trump: Dems Must ‘Guarantee’ All Wall Funding in DACA Bill”, Roll 
Call, 3.11.2017, https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/trump-dems-must-guarantee-all-wall-
funding-in-daca-bill [accessed: 22.11.2017].
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and contrasted with a similar set of modern politicies as defi ned and promoted by 
the anti-globalist parties or fractions that have emerged from the recent elections 
in the USA (the Alt-Right), France (Front National), Germany (AfD) and Poland 
(Kukiz 15’ and a large faction within PiS).
Table 3. Old and New Anti-Globalism
Anti-globalism 1900–1939 
(based on H. James)
Modern anti-globalism (M. Kuź)
1) anti-migration sentiments buttressed 
by the move to protect the national 
labor market;
2) slanting critique of bankers and 
currency speculators;
3) antisemitism;
4) general statist protectionism;
5) faith in the state;
6) nationalism;
7) national socialism, socialism and 
communist as the main alternative 
visions of politics;
8) interstate war was a major threat to 
the global world order and a result of 
protectionism
1) anti-migration sentiments buttressed by the move to 
protect the welfare state and national identity;
2) critique of multinational corporations and fi nancial 
institutions;
3) anti-Americanism (in Germany and France), ant-
Islamism (in the West in general), critique of international 
organizations;
4) selective protectionism of chosen sectors;
5) limited faith in state mixed with some libertarian senti-
ments, the state is seen as a protector from outside infl u-
ence that should, nevertheless, give relative freedom to 
the citizens within;
6) nationalism mixed with communitarian sentiments 
(importance of substate structures such as city move-
ments and small communities);
7) lack of clearly defi ned ideological alternatives apart 
from a general desire to cool down the globalization;
8) war seen as a threat, however, the development of 
global economy without global cooperation creates new 
threats such as: environmental pollution, climate change 
and humanitarian crises
Source: own analysis.32
The above comparison indicates that, perhaps, for all the fears that the new 
political divide raises the situation, is still not as dire and divisive as a hundred 
years ago. Nevertheless, the uncanny similarity between anti-globalist politics 
now and then strongly suggest a similar mechanism at play. The global economy, 
which in turn creates a global political dynamic, has only existed since the 19th 
century. It is too early to suggest this with all confi dence, however, what we 
might be witnessing is a cyclical fl uctuation of global politics from more to less 
globalization.
Previously during such a fl uctuation, the system regulated itself using the 
most violent means possible. Nonetheless, the fl uctuations of elites and ideologies 
32 My comparison here is based on the analysis of the political programs of the most ex-
tremely anti-globalist forces in Poland, Germany and France, however it needs to be noted that all 
major parties are to be found somewhere on the spectrum. In some political systems the largest, 
most mainstream parties are decidedly more anti-globalist, e.g. PiS in Poland in others, as in Ger-
many they are clearly more globalist.
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does not need to necessarily take on violent forms. It is a well-known fact from 
the fi eld of comparative politics. State level-politics in the state formation period 
also typically took on violent forms of civil wars or coups, however, over time in 
many states it has become more tame and regular. Of course, from time to time, 
the politics of democratic countries still becomes very intense and anti-establish-
ment. This usually indicates that the previous establishment and previous set of 
commitments became outdated and is in need of a correction. Skowronek’s typol-
ogy describing how American presidents interact with their political environment 
seems to be especially pertinent to the conceptualization of the anti-establishment 
turns and Trump’s presidency. In his work Skowronek distinguishes 4 types of 
presidents, based on their relation to previously established commitments and 
their political identities.




Opposed Affi  liated 
Vulnerable Politics of reconstruction Politics of disjunction
Resilient Politics of preemption Politics of articulation
Source: S. Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: leadership from John Adams to George Bush, 
Cambridge–London 1993, p. 36.
It is crucial for a president to recognize what is the state of the previously 
established commitments. In short, is the society ready for a change, and is the 
old establishment weak. Politics of disjunction is generally that of presidents who 
are reactive, although, they are expected to be proactive and break the previously 
established commitments. Herbert Hoover, with his notoriously inept approach to 
the great crisis, is one example of politics of disjunction. Politicians of preemp-
tion, on the other hand, seek a benefi cial change too early, when the establishment 
is strong and the society at large opposes it. Woodrow Wilson, with his interesting 
but underestimated vision of the new global order, is a classic example. Finally, 
politics of reconstruction is the politics of major change that is welcomed and 
brings the president strength and popularity. Ronald Raegan can be described 
as a politician of reconstruction. Politics of articulation, in turn, only capitalized 
on the successful reconstruction, just like George Bush (senior) capitalized on 
Raegan’s success.
Diff erent elements of presidential politics acquire a following or discon-
tinuation at diff erent periods of time. For instance, one may view president Oba-
ma’s presidency as the presidency of a late articulation. Articulation pertaining 
to a yearning for the Clinton years and the “go-go-nineties” atmosphere. Obama, 
naturally, discontinued some elements of Bush-era interventionism. Over time, 
however, the neoliberal consensus and the globalist rhetoric became more and 
more at odds with the social sentiments. This became especially visible during 
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Obama’s second term, when the relation between the president and the republican 
congress led to a serious crisis.
Nevertheless, Obama’s disjunction was not deep enough to create a ful-
ly-fl edged reconstruction. President Trump was elected as a protest candidate, 
especially on the part of the blue collar northern working-middle-class voter, 
who went into the “disjunction” mode during the late Obama years. However, 
“established commitments” also pertain to maintaining a desirable state of rela-
tions with elite interests groups. And Trump clearly faces more criticism from 
the media and various elite groups than many other leaders.33 Similar criticism 
was visible during the typically reconstructive Raegan presidency, although, over 
time president Reagan managed to gain a wide popularity, even with the media 
and interests groups that initially were critical of his personality and actions. It is 
not impossible for Trump to move in that direction, should he win a second term. 
Even so, it seems much more diffi  cult than may appear. At this point, the Ameri-
can presidential politics seems to be in a state of an uneasy stasis with constant 
tensions and a media fog of war hanging over the main players. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that so far most of the candidates in the run-off  election to congress, 
who have been supported by Trump, won their seats. The Russian-involvement 
commission failed to come up with solid evidence of Trumps foul plays. And his 
approval a year after the election is at a stable 40%.
 What president Trumps does clearly show is, however, that over time the 
globalist commitments will become more and more questioned. Sooner or later 
a new reconstruction will be needed both in American and in global politics, even 
if it is not Trump who will perform it. Let us not forget that it was Franklin De-
lano Roosevelt (a president of a great reconstruction), who eventually instituted 
the key elements of Wilsonian politics. A politics that was so strongly opposed 
during Wilson’s lifetime.
Conclusions and Loose Ends
Skowronek’s simple model shows how, the procedural mechanism of a modern 
democratic state can absorb social tensions, which in a diff erent institutional con-
text could very well lead to a destructive confl ict or, indeed, a civil war. The 
question we are now facing is whether the same mechanism that helps to avoid 
regulating the system through large-scale wars can be applied on a global level. 
Describing the institutional recipe for this achievement is beyond the scope of 
this work. However, it does seems that the world politics is going through a pro-
cess similar to Skowronek’s cycles. 
33 Cf. R. Singh, “I, the People: A Defl ationary Interpretation of Populism, Trump and the 
United States Constitution”, Economy and Society 2017, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 20–42.
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The global order predicated on the liberal theory of international rela-
tions is undergoing a severe crisis not because of ill-will of morally evil actors 
but because of evident structural problems. Global inequality, mass migration, 
dissatisfaction of the middle and working classes, ineptness of international 
organizations all add to the mix. In a situation where liberal institutions are 
failing and new ones (like for instance the coalition of cities described by Ben-
jamin Barber34) never materialize, the only logical solution is to fall back on 
exiting state structures and global politics based on the balance of powers. In 
other words, liberal globalization needs to be cooled down to preserve global 
stability. Perhaps, with better technologies and ideas humanity will be able to 
return to the concept of liberal globalization, but at this point the stakes seem 
to be too high to risk another step in the direction of the globalistic dream. 
This anti-globalistic rebalancing is clearly an element foreshadowed in presi-
dent Trump’s policies and in his political rhetoric. In spite of president Trump 
obvious lack of experience as a professional politician, this message needs to 
be taken with all seriousness.
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Trump i antyglobalistyczne równoważnie na Zachodzie
Polityka zagraniczna prezydenta Trumpa bywa postrzegana jako część szerszego politycznego 
przesunięcia, które poważa obecny liberalny ład globalny i większą nadzieję pokłada w państwie 
narodowym. Wydarzenia takie jak: Brexit, porażka referendalna Matteo Renziego oraz ogólne 
wzmocnienie się ugrupowań populistycznych są często przytaczanymi przykładami. Politycy opi-
sywani jako populiści bądź też nacjonaliści nadal nie są dominującą siłą w większości krajów 
rozwiniętych. Jednakże nowy układ polityczny, który wychodzi poza powojenny podział na pra-
wicę i lewicę, jest wyraźnie widoczny. Artykuł proponuje wydzielenie dwóch obozów: globalizmu 
i lokalizmu (oraz skupienie się zwłaszcza na narodowym lokalizmie). Analizuje również pierwsze 
lata prezydentury Donalda Trumpa używając do tego narzędzi zaproponowanych przez Harolda 
Jamesa i Stephena Skowronka.
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Trump and the Anti-Globalization Rebalancing Within the West
President’s Trumps international agenda can be viewed as a part of a wider political shift, which 
undermines the current liberal global order and places more emphasis on the nation state. Events 
such as Brexit, Matteo Renzi’s lost referendum, the general strengthening of far-right and populist 
parties are often cited in this context. The politicians described as populists or nationalists are still 
not a dominant force in most of the elections in developed countries. However, a new divide that 
moves beyond the post-war left-right division can be clearly observed and variously described. This 
study will propose the notions of two ideological camps: globalism and localism (with a special fo-
cus on national-localism). It will also examine the fi rst year of president Trump’s presidency using 
the historical analysis tools proposed by Harold James and Stephen Skowronek.
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